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Abstract 
This work proposes a critical, non systematic, review of the three
main lines of health policy interventions to deal with risky behaviours,
such as over-eating, smoking, sedentary lives, and excess alcohol
drinking, namely: i) the release of information on health risks and
consequences; ii) the use of incentives; and iii) direct policy interven-
tion in markets, through regulation and taxation. First, the health and
economic impact of the risky behaviours epidemics are briefly
described. Then a critical review follows on the evidence existing on
the effectiveness of each type of intervention. The review will also
highlight the public health approach staying beyond each type of poli-
cy on risky behaviours and critically consider them within the context
of more general health and social policy interventions.
Introduction
Risky behaviours, such as over-eating, smoking, sedentary lives,
and excessive alcohol consumption are major drivers of chronic health
conditions, premature deaths, and health care spending. In this work
I argue that public health decision-makers have dealt with the current
dramatic rise of risky behaviours by implementing three main arms of
health policies: i) releasing information on health risks and conse-
quences (label); ii) introducing incentives (nudge); and iii) directly
intervening in markets, through regulation and taxation (tax). 
In order to contribute to inform health policy-making, in the present
work I review and discuss the most rigorous scientific evidence
assessing the relative effectiveness of each type of interventions. At
the same time, I highlight the public health approach staying beyond
each type of policy on risky behaviours, and critically consider them
within the context of more general health and social policy interven-
tions. The next section provides some figures on the challenges for
public health related to the rise of risky behaviours. The next section
critically review the main health policies within the health information
arm, the incentives’ one, or the direct public intervention arm. The last
section discusses the potential scope for behavioural health policy and
briefly concludes.The risky behaviours’ epidemics
There is increasing consensus among public health researchers
that over-eating, smoking, sedentary lives, and excess alcohol drinking
are currently the four big killers in western countries. These behav-
ioural risk factors are in fact known causes of a number of chronic
health conditions which, in turn, are primary drivers of premature
death, and health care spending.1 The dramatic figures related to the
four big killers cannot be over-emphasised: according to the World
Health Organisation (WHO), as many as 80 million disability-adjusted
life years (DALYs) were lost in 2004 in the world in the age group 15-
59 because of overweight, obesity, high cholesterol, high blood pres-
sure or high blood glucose.2 Moreover, 60 million DALYs lost in the
same year were attributable to alcohol use, and further 33 million
related to tobacco use. Finally, physical inactivity, on its own, accounts
for more than 15 million DALYs lost. 
Obesity, in particular, has been identified as a global epidemic.
According to the WHO, more than a billion adults are overweight
worldwide, and 700 million will be clinically obese by 2015.3 According
to the latest health data by OECD,4 the 30.9% of the adults in the US,
the 24.2% in Mexico, and the 22% in the UK adults were obese in the
early 2000s, with the overall figures expected to be around one third of
the adult population in each country by now. About 320,000 deaths a
year are attributed to obesity in Europe,5 and 30,000 in UK.6 The annu-
al direct costs (treating obesity and its consequences) and indirect
costs (lost earnings due to premature mortality and attributable sick-
ness) related to obesity are estimated at £3.3-3.7 billion in the UK
only.7
According to the statistics in some recent reports on the obesity epi-
demics,8-11 US citizens have increased their BMI from 1970 to 2000 by
+8.9% (24.6 to 26.3), but obese people (in the 95th percentile tail of
distribution) have put on weight much more quickly than average, by
+16.8% (33.9 to 39.6). The distribution of obesity across population
may also be of concern for public policy, since in the US obese subjects
have an average age of 45-55 years, while in the UK an adult in the
lower income class is 25% more likely to become obese than in the top
income class. In the UK, the only decrease in BMI in the last thirty
years concerns young women from the very top-income class.8
The impact of the other behavioural risk factors should not be
under-estimated either: the total direct and indirect costs related to
alcohol consumption amounts to the 2.7% of the GDP in the US.2 The
healthcare costs related to tobacco consumption, on the other hand,
amount to $76 billion in the US, $14.7 in Germany and $2.25 in the
UK.12
Significance for public health
Risky behaviours, such as over-eating, smoking, sedentary lives, and excess
alcohol drinking are primary drivers of chronic health conditions, premature
deaths, and health care spending. Public health decision-makers have dealt
with risky behaviours by implementing three clusters of health policies: i)
releasing information on health risks and consequences; ii) introducing
incentives; and iii) directly intervening in markets, through regulation and
taxation. In order to inform current and future health policy-making, the
time is ripe to gather rigorous scientific evidence to assess the relative effec-
tiveness of each type of interventions. At the same time it is crucial to high-
light the public health approach staying beyond each type of policy on risky
behaviours, and to critically consider them within the context of more gen-
eral health and social policy interventions. Such a critical review lacks at the
moment. This work aims at contributing to fill this gap.
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Public health policies for risky behaviours
Facing such dramatic figures from rising global epidemics, how have
the health policy-makers in the western countries reacted insofar? In
the present work, I argue that public health policies have typically dealt
with the four big killers using three main arms. These are three clus-
ters of public interventions, grounded on three very distinct economic
arguments, that can actually be ranked according to the increasing
interference with individual decision-making and the market forces
within the health sector. 
Moving ideally from the less to the more intrusive policy interven-
tions, the typical three clusters have been: i) the release of information
on health risks; ii) the use of incentives; iii) the direct public interven-
tion through taxes and regulation. In what follows, I briefly review and
critically discuss the main scientific evidence on the effects of each of
these arms of health policies for risky behaviours.Health information
The less interfering type of policy intervention is the release of infor-
mation, for instance, on the health risks related to the risky behav-
iours. It is a minimally invasive public intervention since individuals
still have the same set of choices, and are simply given more informa-
tion to support their free decisions. The implicit assumption underly-
ing this position is that the more information a consumer (a citizen, a
patient) has, the better it is. This assumption is one of the traditional
assumptions by mainstream, neoclassical, economics, which also pos-
tulates a related set of more general assumptions on human behaviour,
namely that i) people are indeed fully rational decision-makers, who ii)
process all available information; iii) plan ahead their future actions
and have rational expectation; iv) compute the trade-offs between (pre-
sent and future) costs and benefits; v) optimize, that is, find the opti-
mal solution that maximize their own utility based on their underlying
preferences, given the set of constraints. 
Clearly, such a set of strong assumptions can only bring to the con-
clusion that public policy interventions should not interfere with indi-
vidual choices, which are fully rational: for instance, smoking can sim-
ply be a rational addiction, and the decisions of people who chose to
become obese and thus unhealthy, should be regarded as rational, as
the one of people choosing not to invest in their own education, or to
work few hours a week and thus remain under-employed. If really the
government has to intervene - it is argued - it should implement the
least invasive public policy, for instance, by only disclosing information,
in order to enable more informed, and thus better, individual decisions.
Despite the recent financial and economic crisis has contributed to
cast more than one doubt about the ability of the rational expectations
model to predict what happens in the real world, this position, which
often (at some extent erroneously) goes under the label of Chicago
School, is still very influential among academic economists, especially
in the US. 
In the context of risky health behaviours, the partisans of this posi-
tion argue that the government should just expose consumers to com-
plete information about the health risks of smoking, eating too many
calories, following nutritionally poor or unbalanced diets, drinking too
much alcohol, and not doing physical exercise. Once given better infor-
mation, people should then be left alone to make up their free deci-
sions, and no further interference in individual choices should be tol-
erated. 
In principle, a number of health policies in the OECD countries can
be thought to be consistent with this position: for instance, the labels
of the type Smoking kills on cigarettes’ packages, and the related health
information on the risks of smoking; or, generally, the nutritional
labelling on the food items, reporting calories, daily recommended
amounts and other nutritional information; or the informational cam-
paigns of the type 5-a-day, for the portions of fruits and vegetables; or
2(3) alcohol units a day for the alcoholic drinks for women (men); and
in generally the idea of running informational campaigns, distributing
leaflets and posters and similar. Of course, I am not so fool to argue that
all these informational policies have been actually launched and imple-
mented by a gang of hard-nosed mainstream economists. Rather, what
I wish to stress here is that for people sharing their views, health poli-
cies to tackle risky behaviours should never go much beyond these type
of informational interventions. 
From the perspective of an empirical researcher, I feel it is much
more useful to directly turn the attention to the available scientific evi-
dence on whether, and at what extent, informational campaigns are
effective in reducing risky health behaviours. As a general picture, it is
probably fair to say that there is little compelling scientific evidence
that health information alone is effective in reducing risky behaviours.
At a macro level this is consistent with the observation that, despite
informational policies have been around for a while, risky behaviours
such as over-eating and obesity, rather than decreasing over time, have
been sharply rising as evidently documented above.
Concerning, more specifically, information on healthy eating, the
existing evidence is rather mixed. For instance, there are studies13 that
have evaluated the already mentioned 5-a-day campaign, an informa-
tional campaign run in UK between 2002 and 2004 to educate British
people to eat at least 5 portions of fruits/vegetables a day, bringing evi-
dence that informational campaign was associated with a +27%
increase of the purchases of fruits and vegetables with respect to what
would have occurred if prices had not changed.* But, even after the 5-
a-day info campaign, the lower income families still consume half
fruits and vegetables than the richer families and reacted much less
sharply (+20% vs +36%). More generally, a review of the scientific
assessments of its effects found that the 5-a-day info campaign raises
awareness of the need to consume more fruit and vegetables, but was
not associated with significant changes in behaviour.8
Little is also known on the effectiveness of nutritional labelling on
foods. In general it is useful to keep in mind that, at least in Europe,
there are two main schemes for nutritional information, namely the
guidelines for daily amounts (GDA) and the traffic lights systems. In
essence, GDA provides full nutritional facts, while the signposts only
report simplified labels with green, amber, red colours on selected
nutritional categories. In Europe there is an ongoing debate on which
system should be preferred: for instance, the UE Commission and
nutritional experts are in favour of GDA, as they argue that signposts
tend to over-simplify the nutrition information. On the other hand, as
reported by George Loewenstein,14 a typical consumer would probably
not disagree with what the US first lady, Michelle Obama, said about
the GDA system in march 2010 to the conference of the American
Association of Grocery Manufacturers: The last thing I had time to do
was to stand in a grocery store aisle squinting at ingredients that I could-
n’t pronounce to figure out whether something was healthy or not. In
the UK the two schemes are voluntary and supermarkets chains choose
the one they prefer: for instance, TESCO uses GDA, M&S used the sign-
posts, while and Waitrose and Sainsbury’s use both. 
There is little, and mixed, evidence on the effects of GDA and sign-
posts nutritional labels, and in general it refers to the US or the UK. For
instance, in the US the Nutritional Labeling and Educating Act (NLEA)
labelling system, a variant of the GDA system, has been implemented
for nutritional information at a cost in the range of $166 billion. An
empirical evaluation of the effects of NLEA labels in the US, using a
Difference-in-Difference empirical approach, found no impact on obe-
sity rates, except the ones of white women who used the labels.15 It
concluded that the NLEA system could have possible benefits only for
the consumers already motivated to eat more healthy foods and that
already use nutritional information on the labels and packages. 
*Actually prices did increase in the 2002-2004 for being most vegetables and fruits imported from out-
side the UK, and that it is important that empirical analysis accounts for it.8
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Similar mixed results have been found for calories labelling in New
York City, where the Department of Health passed a legislation mandat-
ing that from 1st July 2007 all food establishments with standardised
portions (basically, chains of coffee shops and restaurants) have to post
calorie information on their menu boards. Two studies by George
Loewenstein and colleagues16,17 tested whether this information affect-
ed food choices by collecting data at three locations (a coffee shop in
Manhattan, and two hamburger restaurants of the same chain, one in
Manahattan, the other in Brooklyn). Researchers standing outside the
restaurants randomly assigned customers to two treatments: in one
treatment, they received information about suggested calorie intake
per day, in the other calorie intake per meal. They found no impact of
the legislation and of either calories recommendation at the coffee
shop; no impact of the legislation in the restaurant in Manhattan, while
fewer calories were consumed after the legislation in the restaurant in
Brooklyn, especially by people that were already on diet. Moreover they
found that calories-per-meal recommendation significantly increased
the caloric intake of people on diet relative to non-dieters. These
results provide mixed evidence that labelling policies can have some
limited impact on specific groups of the population, while providing
calorie recommendations not only is not effective, but may even have
perverse effects.
Similar evidence is available on the GDA-type informational system,
that was found to lead to increase in consumption of iron and fibres,
but to have no impact on overall intakes of total fat, saturated fat, cho-
lesterol, and no significant impact on obesity rates.8 Also concerning
signposts the existing evidence suggests that labelling works only for
the more motivated and interested consumers, and mostly in terms of
avoiding really bad foods (red light), than choosing genuinely healthy
food (green light).18+
More encouraging evidence about the effectiveness of nutritional
labels come from a recent experiment.14 About 1200 subjects were
recruited for survey study, in exchange for free snacks, and randomly
assigned to one of 10 labelling conditions, varying from either no infor-
mation, or calories information only, or daily intakes references, or
information about the minutes to be spent on a treadmill, or the traffic
lights rating, or finally, some heuristic cue such as the expected body
size associated with the food. In general, the experimental results sup-
port the idea that labelling can lead to some decrease in the calories of
the chosen snacks.14 Not all types of labelling, however, were equally
effective. In particular, the effects of numerical information tend to be
rarely significant and smaller than the ones from heuristic cues. For
instance, significant decrease (that is of -10% or larger) in the calories
of chosen snacks occur only when numeric information was in terms of
minutes on treadmill and percentage of daily snacks calories.
Interestingly, the effects was much more significant (-20% or larger)
when labelling used heuristic cues such as traffic lights and expected
body size. Moreover, and importantly, no effect in normal weight sam-
ple, but significant effect in overweight sample.14
More generally, a systematic review19 found that both GDA and sign-
posts do not lead to consumers avoiding unhealthy foods, but only to
moderate their consumption; and that both labels only trigger local sub-
stitution effects, in the sense that consumers switch to healthier
options within the same categories, but not radically alter the structure
of their diet. Importantly, however, nutritional labels can in principle
also have some effects on the producers: manufacturers may change
the composition of some foods to obtain more attractive nutritional
labels. 
Substantially similar results concern the evidence on the informa-
tional policies about the risks of smoking or alcohol abuse. 
+Incidentally, this is consistent with the often quoted claim that negative messages tend to consistent-
ly work better than positive.
The general message seems to be that people are much more aware
of risks, but struggle to change their daily habits, although lots of prom-
ising empirical research is currently going on in health economics on
the effects of the public bans to smoke in public places, for instance.
Also, notice there are researchers who argue that informational poli-
cies should not be judged on the ground of effectiveness only. In fact, it
is argued, more health information is (socially) beneficial even if it
produces no changes in behaviour, since it enables people to choose
what they prefer,20 an argument which is consistent with the above dis-
cussed presumption that more information is always beneficial for
making better choices.
Before moving to the second arm of health policies, it may be of
interest to describe a recent field experiment,21 which provides one of
the few direct analysis of the interaction between information provi-
sion and behavioural incentives (nudges in the asymmetric paternalism
approach proposed by Camerer, Loewenstein and colleagues,22 and by
the bestseller book by Thaler and Sunstein:23 see below and last section
for a discussion). Researchers approached customers entering a fast-
food sandwich restaurant and offered them a free meal in exchange for
the participation to a survey. Customers who agreed to participate were
asked to pick a sandwich, and then a side dish and a drink from a pro-
vided menu; they then completed the survey; and were finally given a
voucher with their order to be passed on to the restaurant. The differ-
ent treatments interacted the release of caloric information for menu
items and of daily calories recommendation, and the manipulation of
different nudges on the convenience of the healthy options. Non-finan-
cial incentives were given in different treatments to make healthier
options more convenient: for instance, in one treatment healthy
options were the default choices in the first page of the menu, in anoth-
er there was an immediate extra effort required to order a less healthy
option (opening a sealed packet). 
Both calorie information and calorie recommendation were found to
decrease calories in ordered foods.21 Both the non-financial incentives
increased the likelihood to choose sandwich options with lower calo-
ries. The default option, however, appeared to also induce a compensa-
tory effect on non-sandwich calories that completely offset the impact
of calorie information.° Financial incentives
A more direct form of health policy intervention advocates the use of
incentives. Economists believe we respond to incentives, and econom-
ics is, at a large extent, exactly the analysis of incentives. It is thus
rather natural for economists to believe that, in principle, under appro-
priate incentives, people may react changing their health behaviours.
The fast-growing rise of behavioural and experimental economics has
contributed to broaden the analysis of incentives and to base it on rig-
orous scientific evidence rather than theoretical arguments. Within the
economists’ community, in fact, the more constructive challenges to
the traditional mainstream view currently comes from the field of
experimental and behavioural economics, a research camp that is more
interested to understand how people actually choose and behave,
rather than to speculate on how they should take decisions and actions.
In the past thirty-forty years, hundreds of experimental economists,
often pooling together with psychologists, neuroscientists, and medical
doctors, have generated piles of original data through lab and field
experiments, and empirically tested the hypotheses that people are
rational decision-makers, plan ahead, rationally trade-off and so on. 
In 2002, the experimental approach has been consecrated by the
Nobel prize to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith. 
°Also other experiments found evidence of compensatory behaviour in healthy eating.24,25
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Some of the results of the experimental research by Kahneman and
experimental colleagues can perfectly illustrate the Copernican revolu-
tion that is expected to slowly reshape economics: thousands of exper-
iments show that we are human beings, and as such, we do make lots
of mistakes and errors; we are often unable to make the best choice for
us, or sometimes we even do not know what is best for us; we are often
let down by too much information and choice; we suffer from risk aver-
sion, loss aversion, myopia, impatience, and overconfidence; we often
take decisions and actions that seem more satisfying rather than opti-
mizing. 
Concerning health behaviours, behavioural economists have pro-
posed a new approach that is not based on information but on incen-
tives and other nudges. This approach is sometimes called asymmetric
paternalism22 or libertarian paternalism,23 and has two central ele-
ments. First, is libertarian in the sense that it intends to shift behav-
iour in self-interested directions, without questioning the ultimate
freedom of choice by individuals. Secondly, is asymmetric or paternalist
in the sense that it intends to only help people who decide and behave
in a self-destructive way. 
The introduction of incentives and nudges is currently of the highest
importance across the whole spectrum of public policy interventions,
from health and social care, to pensions and financial markets, to
crime, the environment and climate change, especially in the UK where
the Cabinet Office has recently released the MINDSPACE report draw-
ing insights from behavioural sciences26 and has established a
Behavioural Insights Team to support policy decisions. Also, in coun-
tries such as the US and the UK, where the rise of the above described
risky behaviours epidemics has been more dramatic, the public opinion
often divides itself in favour or against the political proposal to pay peo-
ple to quit smoking, to lose weight, to exercise more, or to eat more
fruits or vegetables. Broadly speaking, appropriate incentives in health
can be designed to induce people to change their health behaviours,
either by making healthy activities cheaper (for instance, subsidising
healthy foods such as vegetables and fruits, or regular physical exer-
cise); or by limiting unhealthy behaviours (for instance, rewarding the
ones who quit smoking, cut alcohol drinks, or lose weight).§ A complete
review of the type, role and effects of financial incentives in health is
clearly far beyond the scope of this discussion, also because there is
quite a lot of work in progress at the moment.# Here I will only focus on
a discussion and brief review of the incentives related to the four big
killers. These incentives usually target subjects in the general popula-
tion, or in some sub-categories at a higher risk, such as smokers, obese
people, pregnant mothers, children. Usually, the targeted behaviours is
habitual, as in the case of over-eating, smoking, sedentary lives, alco-
hol abuse. As mentioned, the intended targeted behaviour may consist
in removing an unhealthy behaviour (e.g. quit smoking, cut alcohol
drinks, do not eat fats or sugars) or in promoting an healthy behaviour
(e.g. eating more fruits or vegetables, making regular physical exer-
cise). Most of the times, of course, the intended objective is a sustained
change of behaviours over time, and not just a one-off change. 
§The scope of introducing incentives in health is much wider, though, and incentives in health can be
implemented in different forms according to: Target subjects: subsamples of the general population
(consumers, workers, kids, mothers); patients; healthcare professionals (e.g. doctors, nurses); Target
behaviours: health behaviours; undertaking medical treatments, screening and diagnostic tests, vaccina-
tions, medical compliance/adherence; outputs, prescriptions, performance; blood and organ donation;
Characteristics of the behaviour: risky habits (smoking, drinking, over-eating, sedentary lives) versus
socially desirable activities (blood and organs donation); repeated vs one-off behaviour; removing
unhealthy behaviour versus promoting healthy behaviours; Characteristics of the incentive: cash, vouch-
ers, prizes, deposits, lotteries, for instance.
#In the UK, for instance, the Wellcome Trust has established and funded with a strategic grant the Centre
for the Study of Incentives in Health (CSIH), a joint inter-disciplinary inter-university research centre by
Kings’ College London, London School of Economics, and  Queen Mary University London, which involves
psychologists, behavioural and experimental economists, and philosophers and experts in bioethics. An
analogous initiative in the US is the Center for Health Incentives and Behavioural Economics (CHIBE) at
the University of Pennsylvania. Researchers in these, and other, centres are currently working on origi-
nal experimental studies and systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the effects of financial incentives.
Although all incentives are conditional on observed changes in
behaviours, in practice they can take very different forms, including
money, non-monetary payments (e.g. goods, vouchers, health-related
goods), prizes, lotteries.
Before reviewing the existing evidence, it is worthwhile to point out
that, from an empirical economist’s perspective, there are at least two
main issues related to the use of financial incentives for healthier
behaviours. The first, central, question concerns whether financial
incentives indeed work. Generally speaking, the effectiveness of incen-
tives can only be tested through randomised controlled experiments,
similar to RCTs in medical and pharmacological studies.
In the experimental intervention, subjects are randomly assigned to
either a control group (C) with no incentive, or to one, or more, treat-
ment groups (T) where treated subjects are given financial incentives
conditional to health behaviours. Behaviour in the field is observed and
then compared across the control and treatment groups. Incentives are
effective when there are statistically significant differences (Δ) in
observed outcomes between the control and the treatment groups.
Moreover, the most reliable studies follow subjects for a sufficiently
long period after incentives are removed, and some adopt a so-called
Difference-in-Difference design, which consists in comparing the dif-
ferences over time across C and T before and after a natural occurring
intervention. 
In general, an incentive can be said to be effective if, at the end of
the intervention, the difference in the average intended change in
behaviour is positive and (statistically) significantly different from
zero, that is if Δ(T-C)>0. Incentives are not effective if the difference
is not statistically different from zero, that is if Δ(T-C)=0.
Of course, one can further disentangle the effects related to effec-
tiveness, for instance analysing the relative effectiveness; or the cost-
effectiveness of incentives; or, again, their long-term effectiveness,
intended as the sustainability of change in behaviour: subjects, in fact,
can respond to incentives with one-off changes in behaviours, but fail
to sustain the changed behaviours in the long run.
The second main issue with incentives in health is related on
whether incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation. This hypothe-
sis was originally investigated by Richard Titmuss about blood dona-
tions27 and then further developed by behavioural economists such as
Bruno Frey, among others.28 Basically, by attaching a price to some-
thing that was originally done for free, we may attract some more peo-
ple to donate blood, but the donors that were already giving blood may
react by stopping doing it. They, in fact, may prefer to rather avoid to be
seen as donating blood just for money. From this perspective, incen-
tives to donate blood may end up by making blood donations no longer
a pro-social activity, and becoming just a market exchange. 
The literature on incentives in health discusses about the theoreti-
cal possibility that, if you pay people to quit smoking or lose weight,
they may react by not doing what originally intended to be targeted by
the incentives, as they do not want to be seen as doing it just for
money.29 In the experimental framework discussed above, evidence
from crowding out would be consistent with an average negative
change in the targeted behaviour: Δ(T-C)<0.
There is an increasing number of randomized controlled experi-
ments studying the effects of financial incentives for encouraging quit-
ting smoking, physical exercise, healthier diets, and weight loss.
Concerning smoking cessation, a randomised controlled trial paid preg-
nant women vouchers that were contingent (in the treatment group) or
not (in the control group) to quitting smoking, and observed subjects
during pregnancy and 12 weeks after vouchers were removed, finding
that contingent vouchers were more effective in inducing smoking ces-
sation and that effects were sustained up to 24 weeks post-partum
(that is, 12 weeks after end of vouchers).30
Another study randomly assigned 179 smokers who were participat-
ing to a five sessions program during 8 weeks (where nicotine patches
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were given to participants) to either an incentivised or a control group:
in the treatment group subjects were given $20 for each session they
were participating, plus $100 if they actually quitted smoking at the end
of the program.31 The study looked at both the short-run and the long-
run effectiveness of incentives. In the short-run, by looking at 75 days
after the end of the program, it found significantly higher rates of
enrolment in, and completion of, the program, and also of quitting
rates, in the treatment group, suggesting that incentives worked.
Effects, however, were not significantly different in the long-run: in
fact, 6 months after the end of the program, quitting rates were not sig-
nificantly different across the treatment and the control groups. Thus
financial incentives were only effective in the short run, although they
did not crowd-out intrinsic motivation either.
Concerning physical exercise, a study randomly assigned university
students to three groups: either a control group (C) where they were
given handouts explaining the health benefits of regular physical exer-
cise; or a low incentive group (L), where they received $25 if they
attended the gym at least once a week; or finally a high incentive group
(H), where they received $100 if they attended the gym at least 8 times
a month.32 Subjects were observed during all the intervention and also
up to seven weeks after the incentives were removed. The study found
that post-intervention attendance of gym was significantly higher in
treatment H than in groups C and L. The main conclusion of signifi-
cantly higher attendance the high incentive group was confirmed by a
second study, where they randomize students across 3 groups: in all
groups subjects were given handouts and paid $75 in advance, and,
while in the control group (C’) there was no further requirement, in
one treatment group (L’) subjects were required to attend gym once in
a week, and in the other (H’) they were required to attend the gym 8
times a month. Motivated by the fact, that the higher attendance was
mostly driven by subjects who before were not regular gym attendees,
the authors interpret the results in terms of positive habit formation,
thus ruling out the possibility that financial incentives may crowd-out
intrinsic motivation.32
Concerning incentives for healthy diets, a study on children first
elicited children’s liking of six vegetables before intervention.33 A total
of 472 children were then randomly assigned to four experimental con-
ditions: a control group, a group where children were repeatedly
exposed (10-12 weeks) to eating vegetables, and other two treatments,
where, together with the exposure, children received either a tangible
reward, or a social reward (public appraisal) if eating more vegetables.
The study re-assessed the likings of the vegetables and also directly
observed the vegetables intakes during all the intervention, and up to
three months after, and found that both liking and intakes increased in
the groups with exposure compared to the control group, and even
more sharply in the sessions with exposure and rewards. Interestingly,
both the effects on intakes and liking persisted after 1 and 3 months,
providing direct evidence that financial incentives to improve healthy
diets are unlikely to crowd-out intrinsic motivation in children. Quite
at the contrary, if the subjects’ intrinsic motivation can be signalled by
the children’s liking of the vegetables, the experiment provides direct
evidence that financial incentives can crowd-in intrinsic motivation to
genuinely appreciate vegetables more. 
There are also some experiments that have looked at financial
incentives for weight loss. The earlier literature, for instance, have run
several randomised control trials where they typically found that
although incentivized groups had quicker and significantly larger
weight losses than in the control group, substantial amounts of weight
was regained three months after the end of the incentive.34,35 More
recently, one study randomly assigned obese patients to either a treat-
ment with steady payment, or with front- or back-loaded incentives and
monitored their weight loss after three and six months.36 The study
found that, after three months subjects in the front loaded incentive
group lose significantly much more weight than in the other groups,
but also that that were no significant difference in the weight loss
across different incentives after 6 months. The evidence from these
experiments suggest that financial incentives for weight loss may
hardly sustainable behavioural changes in the long term, which is con-
sistent with the fact that maintaining weight loss may be the key prob-
lem for obese subjects.
The most encouraging experimental evidence is the one provided by
Volpp, Loewenstein and colleagues at CHIBE. They designed a ran-
domised controlled experiment to study supercharged incentives to lose
weight using several insights from behavioural economics research.37
Their study randomly assigned 57 obese men to three groups and fol-
lowed them during 16 weeks of intervention, plus a six-months follow-
up period. The three groups were a control group (C) where subjects
took part in a weight-monitoring program with monthly weigh-ins: they
had to weigh every morning before eating or drinking and call a num-
ber to report their weight. Also, every end of the month, all subjects had
to weigh on a clinical scale to see if they were below their weight tar-
get. The other group was a deposit contract group (D): subjects could
contribute between $0.01-3.00 each day of month. Their amount was
matched 1 to 1 from the experimenters, who also added $3 per  day, so
that subjects in the group could gain up to $252 a month after the
matching. The deposit, however, was only refundable if, at the end of
the month, they met, or were below, the assigned target for the weight
loss, in which case the deposited money was actually paid out. The last
group was a lottery treatment (L), where subjects were eligible for a
daily lottery only if they reported a weight at, or below, their goal. The
lottery was designed in such a way that it paid frequently small payoffs
($10) and infrequently large payoffs ($100). Another key ingredient of
this treatment was the introduction of punctual feedback to subjects:
every day, right after their reports, subjects received text messages on
their mobile phones that informed them about how much money they
have earned that day in case they have achieved the target, and, if
unsuccessful, about how much they would have earned if they had
reached target. The final element was that subjects successful to lose
weight at the end of the 16 weeks were followed up for 6 months after
end of incentives. 
The main results of the experiment are the following. First, signifi-
cantly higher weight losses and higher success rates after 16 weeks
were observed for subjects in treatments D and L than in the C group.
Concerning longer term effects, subjects were observed 7 months after
the end of the incentives, and, although there were no significant dif-
ferences in weight loss from the end of the intervention across subjects
in the C, D and L groups, subjects in groups D and L still weight signif-
icantly less than at the beginning of the program. This experiment
shows that, even when incentives were removed, subjects did not
regain weight, and that the concern about crowding-out of intrinsic
motivation does not seem to be motivated by direct evidence.
The experiment by Volpp, Loewenstein and colleagues at CHIBE
remains the only one providing unambiguous effects that financial
incentives may potentially work also for inducing significant weight
loss among obese subjects. Compared to previous and alternative tests
of the effectiveness of incentives for weight loss, the experiment by
Volpp, Loewenstein and colleagues seems the one to have devoted the
higher attention to a careful design of supercharged incentives in light
of the most recent insights from behavioural sciences. Actually, consis-
tently with the authors’ specific approach to asymmetric paternalism
(see also below) the design is deliberately and firmly grounded on pre-
vious evidence from behavioural experiments. For instance, the idea of
providing text messages and feedback every day immediately after
weighing on the scale and reporting the weigh was motivated by the
evidence that even small rewards and punishment have great incentive
value. Also, in the same lottery treatment, the choice of frequent small
payoffs and infrequent large payoffs was motivated by the evidence that
people is less risk averse and more attracted by large stakes. Moreover,
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the idea of sending text messages to subjects who did not achieve the
target with feedback on what they could have gained if successful, was
motivated by the evidence that the desire to avoid (anticipated) regret
drives decisions under risk. Finally, the deposit contract in which the
cumulated money could be lost if subjects were unsuccessful in reach-
ing the weight loss target was based on the idea of loss aversion, name-
ly that we react more strongly to losses than to gains of the same
amount. The main message by the paper is that supercharged incen-
tives based on scientific evidence from behavioural sciences can work
also in promoting weight loss, especially in the short term. All in all, the
evidence from existing experiments on the use of incentives to trigger
behavioural changes and to contrast the rise in risky behaviours,
seems to suggest that there is a large potential scope for experimental
and behavioural sciences to design incentive schemes and to provide
scientific evidence to inform effective health policies. Taxation and other direct public interventions
The call for more humble and realistic assumptions about the real
nature of human decision-making and behaviour inspired by the direct
experimental evidence from behavioural economics leaves the door
open to direct policy interventions, which are by definition redundant
and harmful under the mainstream presumption that people always
make perfectly rational decisions and actions. This has led some of the
most distinguished behavioural scientists to call for further forms of pol-
icy interventions that go beyond the use of financial incentives and
nudges, and that potentially involve more coordinated and direct inter-
ventions in markets to deal more effectively with risky health behav-
iours. George Loewenstein, for instance, a leading pioneer of behaviour-
al economics who has extensively worked at the interface between eco-
nomics, psychology and neuroscience, has argued that insurgence of
obesity is also related to a serious misalignment of prices of foods in
markets. He has recently argued that market prices may be essentially
wrong in the food sector:14 in particular, food prices are misaligned
because of both externalities and what he calls internalities. In the econ-
omists’ jargon, externalities are costs that people impose on others but
for which they do not take into account in their private decisions.
Basically, externalities in the food markets are due to the fact that the
prices people pay for unhealthy food (e.g. energy dense foods and
drinks, food high in saturated fats) do not reflect the true direct and
indirect costs to society. From an economic perspective there are argu-
ments to sustain that food prices are too low. For instance, prices of
foods have decreased in real terms in 1975-2005, that is, that prices of
other goods have increased more.8 Moreover, at least in the US, prices
of carbonated drinks, sugars and fats have decreased in real terms in
1975-2005, and have also decreased by a larger extent than prices of
other foods (vegetables for instance).8 This evidence suggests that the
relative prices of energy dense foods have dropped, while the relative
(and absolute) prices of healthy foods have risen. Just as a possible
example, while the real price of fruits and vegetables rose by +17% in
1997-2003, the real price of 2-liter bottle of Coke fell by -35% in 1990-
2007. The above trends have made cheaper and cheaper over time high-
calories-for-nutrient foods, as also suggested by Drewnowski, a public
health researcher in Washington who argues that what really matters is,
in fact, the price for calories. For instance, a direct measurement of
prices for calorie in low- and high-calories-for-nutrient foods available
in US supermarkets found that carrots cost more than 5 times per calo-
rie than chips, and that orange juice cost more than 5 times per calorie
than Coke, and that that price per calorie of vegetable/fruit has
increased over time much more (+40%) than snacks and other energy
dense foods (-23%).38,39 There is also who argues that the US agricultur-
al public policy can be partly responsible for the relative sharper
decrease in the costs of energy dense nutrients, since the US govern-
ment used to subsidise soy and corn production for instance.9 Evidence
that high-calories-for-nutrient foods are less (and becoming less and
less) expensive than low-calories-for-nutrient in terms of price per calo-
rie is not confined to US, though: for instance, vegetables were found to
cost more than 3 times than candies in supermarkets also in Israel.40 If
prices of energy dense foods are wrong in the sense they are too low, the
food industry does not directly bear the higher external costs to society
of health consequences of unhealthy foods. This motivates the introduc-
tion of a typical public economics instruments to deal with externalities,
namely taxes. Taxes are indeed the most typical example of health poli-
cy intervention within to the third cluster of more direct policies to deal
with risky behaviours. Taxes, in fact, by changing the market prices,
directly interfere with the market mechanisms and affect consumers’
choices and decisions. Examples of taxes on risky behaviours are
already present in most developed countries, and, for instance, are usu-
ally levied on cigarettes and alcoholic drinks.** Aiming to a similar goal
to correct externalities, analogous taxes are levied on the use of oil- and
carbon-based energy resources (e.g. carbon tax). The correction of an
externality is in fact the main economic argument beyond the discus-
sion of introducing taxes on foods containing high amounts of fats, or
saturated fats (such as the so called fat tax), or of sugars (for instance,
the soda tax on sweet drinks). Few economic studies have simulated the
likely effects of possible fat taxes. For instance, it has been calculated
that, in the US, an increase in VAT up to 17.5% on fat foods can reduce
ischemic risks of 1.8-2.6% with more a 1000 lives saved a year.41 A sim-
ulation of the introduction of fat tax in the UK based on actual calories
consumption, found that 2% of poorest consumers would pay 7 times as
much the proportion of their income as the 2% richest consumers.42 It
has also been calculated that a tax proportional to fat content can reduce
fat intake of 1%, and that burden on poor consumers would be 10 times
higher.43 Some of the advocates of more direct health policy interven-
tions to deal with the rise of risky behaviours also praise for a more sys-
tematic and integrated set of health policies to accompany the introduc-
tion of, say, a fat tax. For instance, Loewenstein argues that health pol-
icy should accompany the introduction of a tax on production and sale
of unhealthy foods to the subsidization of healthy foods (e.g. vegetables,
fruit); a mandatory progressive pricing of junk foods (for instance in
terms of calories) to stop supersizing by fast food and supermarkets; and
actions aiming at lowering the cost of exercise (for instance, more bike
paths, walking children to school, discourage the use of cars, subsidize
gym member, or even public transports).14
Conclusions From risky behaviours to behavioural health policy
As I discussed above, prices may be misaligned also because of inter-
nalities. Internalities can be defined as the costs that people impose on
themselves but that they do not (sufficiently) take into account in their
decisions.14 Basically, the prices that people pay do not reflect the true
costs to themselves. This is an area which is central to the research
agenda of behavioural economists such as George Loewenstein: why
would people fail to internalize costs to themselves? Experimental evi-
dence from Loewenstein and other behavioural economists suggest
that this may be due a variety of reasons related to how people decide
and behave in the real world, including the lack of information, the
mis-perception of risks, the lack of self-control, the existence of pres-
ent-biased preferences. These behavioural factors and internalities are
deeply rooted attitudes in human beings and it is rather unlikely that
they can be simply removed by information and, in many health con-
texts, perhaps even by simple financial incentives. 
**Even though in these cases the public health motivation is confounded by the fact that, from a public
economics perspective, it is optimal to tax those goods for their relatively low price elasticity.
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This calls back for a better understanding of the behavioural deter-
minants of health risky behaviours. Once we understand the deeply
rooted determinants of health behaviours, we can use them to help peo-
ple to be aware of, and possibly solve, internalities. This is indeed the
essence of the above mentioned specific approach to asymmetric pater-
nalism that Loewenstein, Volpp and colleagues are proposing: using
decision errors that normally hurt people to instead help them.44
Although relatively new, this approach of supercharging incentives and
nudges has already prove to be largely effective. Still, more remains to
be done by experimental and behavioural scientists who wish to inform
the design of more effective health policies to curb the dramatic burden
of risky behaviours. 
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